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INFORMING EXPECTATIONS THROUGH VISUAL CUES:
CREATING THE ASSURANCE OF JUSTICE IN
REGULATORY TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
Giulianna K. Ruiz∗
“It is seeing which establishes our place in the world; we explain
that world with words, but words can never undo the fact that we are
surrounded by it.”
—JOHN BERGER, WAYS OF SEEING 1 (Penguin Books 1977)
(1972).
INTRODUCTION
The Founders included the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee, “nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa1
tion,” as assurance that the newly formed democracy would be a
2
“just” society. Justice, however, is an elusive concept—a reflection of
3
society’s changing perceptions. Although it may be comforting to
believe in an a priori definition of justice, and even more comforting
∗
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1
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment guarantee against taking without compensation is commonly referred to as the Takings Clause and was incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment in 1897. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235–41 (1897). Most states have
included a similar guarantee in their constitutions, with the few that have not, including it by either statute or judicial mandate. See Marc R. Poirier, Regulatory Takings, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 10A, §§ 10A.20–10A.22[2] (Michael B. Gerrard, Esq., ed., 1999) (1992) [hereinafter, Poirier, Regulatory Takings] (table of state
taking provisions).
2
E.g., William Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the
Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 712 (1985) [hereinafter Treanor, The Origins] (discussing James Madison’s liberalist approach on property, noting that for Madison, “[a] government that provided compensation when it
took real or personal property demonstrated its commitment to personal freedom”).
3
See, e.g., T. Nicolaus Tideman, Takings, Moral Evolution, and Justice, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 1714, 1715 (1988) (observing that “since we do not possess infinite wisdom,
we are unable to make reliable assertions about the content of this conception of justice”).
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to believe that such an absolute has been successfully memorialized
in the Constitution, history provides proof that the concept of justice
4
evolves with experience. This reality, however, comes into direct
conflict with the popular, albeit misconceived, belief that property
5
rights are absolute.
The impetus behind the inclusion of the Takings Clause in the
Fifth Amendment was the public concern for the potential of majori6
tarian abuse —and that assurance won would not have meant nearly
4

See, e.g., id. at 1720 (noting, for example, that “[o]nly 125 years ago, our laws
incorporated the idea that it was possible for one human being to own another”).
The accepted function of the Supreme Court as the interpreter of the Constitution,
acknowledges that words can and do change to reflect the times. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (“[W]e must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding.”); John Brigham, PROPERTY AND THE POLITICS OF
ENTITLEMENT 21 (1990) (“The opinions of the Supreme Court . . . . are a running
commentary on fundamental concepts, and they disclose ideological shift or continuity in the polity.”). The necessity of change in a functioning government predates
the founding of the United States. See, e.g., EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE
REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 19 (J.G.A. Pocock ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1987) (1790) (“A
state without the means of some change is without the means of conservation. Without such means it might even risk the loss of that part of the constitution which it
wished the most religiously to preserve.”). Furthermore, even in the realm of property principles, which have been described as “sluggish, inert, and timid,” id. at 44,
the necessity for change has been accepted:
Regulations, the wisdom, necessity, and validity of which, as applied to
existing conditions, are so apparent that they are now uniformly sustained, a century ago, or even half a century ago, probably would have
been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive. . . . In a changing world it is
impossible that it should be otherwise.
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
5
E.g., JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise on Civil Government, in TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 286, V § 27 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1691) (standing for the
proposition that the right to property, derivative of the right to life, is an absolute
and a nonnegotiable element of the social contract). Notwithstanding the grounding in Lockean philosophy, some commentators have argued that the notion of absolute property rights only became generally accepted after the Supreme Court recognized diminution to investment-backed expectations as a constitutionally impermissible taking. See Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Tools of Law and the Rule of Law: Teaching
Regulatory Takings After Palazzolo, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 713, 731 (2002).
Early Americans did not recognize these regulations as taking property
because not all expectation interests were recognized as legal interests
until the Supreme Court, in a series of late nineteenth-century rate
regulation cases, constitutionalized the protection of what we now call
investment-backed expectations. Put simply, the bag of early modern
writs did not include one for suing government officials for reducing
the development potential of land caused by the legislative pursuit of
moral topography.
Id.
6
See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 473, 479 (1970) [hereinafter Sax, Public Trust
Doctrine] (“The rationale [for the Takings Clause] is that economic benefits are to be
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as much if the public did not have faith in the permanence of the
7
written word. Naturally, admitting that justice is a malleable term
can result in instinctive unease; but this unease should be dispelled
by the realization that admitting to the term’s flexibility is not to say
that the definition of justice can be changed on a whim, capable of
8
upsetting the comforting notion of justice as absolute. While memorializing a principle in writing guards against dramatic and arbitrary
9
change, it does not preclude gradual change; for the most part,
changes in the definition of justice come about through a process
analogous to evolution—falling beneath the radar of conscious per10
ception. It is this fact—that change is so incremental as to be accepted before there is a general awareness of choice—that maintains
the assurance of security and even fools some into believing in absoprotected against certain kinds of public acquisitiveness lest the cost of public progress be unfairly thrust upon certain individuals or groups instead of upon the general community which benefits from public enterprises.”); Treanor, The Origins, supra
note 2, at 712. In general, one can view all the rights set forth in the Bill of Rights as
a direct response to the concern that the Constitution did not do enough to safeguard individual rights. This concern was evident even before the adoption of the
Constitution. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (John Hamilton) (responding to
New York citizens’ concern that the proposed Constitution did not have a Bill of
Rights).
7
E.g., Kraig Odabashian, Comment, Investment-Backed Expectations and the Politics
of Judicial Articulation: The Reintegration of History and the Lockean Mind in Contemporary
American Jurisprudence, 50 UCLA L. REV. 641, 643 (2002) (concluding that “[f]or
Madison, the technology of a written constitution overcomes the uncertainty of an
evolving political life”).
8
See Tideman, supra note 3, at 1715 (giving an alternate explanation to quiet
society’s unease based on the difficulty of any one definition gaining acceptance).
9
See Odabashian, supra note 7, at 643.
10
See BURKE, supra note 4, at 53 (“The science of constructing a commonwealth
. . . is . . . not to be taught a priori. Nor is it a short experience that can instruct
us . . . .”); Hulsebosch, supra note 5, at 727. Hulsebosch describes the evolutionary
theory of informal amendment to the Constitution as one where “not everyone
agrees on how and when [changes] happen[]. . . . [They] involve[] some mixture of
time, the assimilation of the regulation’s means into our legal culture, and the regulation’s popular acceptance.” Id. See also Carol M. Rose, Property and Expropriation:
Themes and Variations in American Law, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 1, 6–7 [hereinafter Rose,
Property and Expropriation] (noting that some expropriations of property are so “taken
for granted that we barely even notice them”). Although a definition is sometimes
changed by governmental fiat—like the emancipation of slaves—those instances are
few and far between. Id. at 7 (finding that “rights alterations that accompany revolutions and warfare or other upheavals that create massive overthrowings of existing
property rights and resource uses” are “extraordinary”); Tideman, supra note 3, at
1722. Even in those limited circumstances, such a fiat is the culmination of heightened awareness that a previously held notion of justice is in danger of moving outside the boundaries of justice. See United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 156
(1952). For example, when property is lost during a revolution or war, the losses are
accepted because loss in general is expected. Id. (“This Court has long recognized
that in wartime many losses must be attributed solely to the fortunes of war . . . .”).
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11

lute definitions. Furthermore, in many areas of law that are not so
resistant to change as property law, there is a consensus that rigidity
12
in the face of progress does not comport with the illusion of justice.
13
Property rights, a society’s most evident reflection of justice,
should also be considered flexible and able to evolve with changing
expectations—without this flexibility destroying the public’s faith in
14
its society’s commitment to justice. Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized the need for flexibility in the seminal property case, Penn
15
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, by adopting a balancing
test between public interests and private interests to determine
16
whether a regulation was compensable. Unfortunately, the flexibility introduced into regulatory takings jurisprudence was diminished
17
to some extent by Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, which replaced the balancing test in cases of total economic wipeout with a
11

CAROL M. ROSE, Seeing Property, in PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE
HISTORY, THEORY AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 273 (1994) [hereinafter ROSE, Seeing
Property] (“[P]roperty’s brave claims of control and permanence. . . . are often considerably more aspirational than real.”); Rose, Property and Expropriations, supra note
10, at 6.
12
C.f. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 957 (Del. 1985); Epstein v. Gluckin, 135 N.E. 861, 862 (N.Y. 1922). For example, the Supreme Court of
Delaware in Unocal, a seminal case in corporate law, recognized the need to create
new law, in order to comply with the mandates of justice. Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at
957 (“[O]ur corporate law is not static. It must grow and develop in response to, indeed in anticipation of, evolving concepts and needs.”); see also Epstein, 135 N.E. at
862 (contractual remedy case) (“[Where a] formula had its origin in an attempt to fit
the equitable remedy to the needs of equal justice[,] [w]e may not suffer it to petrify
at the cost of its animating principle.”); Hulsebosch, supra note 5, at 732 (calling for
a flexible standard of property rights).
13
Rose, Property and Expropriations, supra note 10, at 4 (noting that David Hume
and Adam Smith “identified the recognition of property as ‘justice’ itself”); c.f.
Hulsebosch, supra note 5, at 716 (“From old limits on testamentary transfers to new
forms of zoning and eminent domain, property law is where our society works out
conflicts between private right and public will.”).
14
See generally, Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24
CARDOZO L. REV. 93, 93–94 (2002) [hereinafter, Poirier, Virtue of Vagueness] (arguing
that “the vague regulatory takings doctrine . . . provide[s] stability, coherence, and
legitimacy for the ongoing social process of managing resources”). For a student
comment that vehemently opposes this view, see Odabashian, supra note 7, at 643–45
(criticizing the Court for replacing “constitutional text” with “a vague analysis of social interest that incorporated the notion of investment-backed expectations,” a standard that could change at the whim of the legislature).
15
438 U.S. 104 (1978).
16
Id. at 124. Use of a balancing test was not new—a predecessor to the Penn Central balancing test was promulgated in the Supreme Court that first recognized that
regulations could constitute regulatory takings. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,
415 (1922). The history of the regulatory takings doctrine is discussed in more detail
in Part I.B of this Comment.
17
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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bright line rule mandating compensation. This Comment proposes
that flexibility can be reintroduced into the Lucas vein of regulatory
takings jurisprudence, especially as concerning environmental regulations in coastal lands, by acknowledging and giving due weight to
the role of visual cues in effectuating public subconscious acceptance
to change.
Courtroom battles regarding coastal land regulations provide an
19
exemplary stage to showcase changes in public expectations. When
in the late 1960s and 1970s environmental concerns came to the fore20
front of public awareness, there was a call to expand coastal land
regulations—not only through the accepted means of a State’s gen21
22
eral police power, but also by use of an ancient, and arguably
23
The
stronger canon of property law—the public trust doctrine.
18

Id. at 1015.
See, e.g., Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wis. 1972).
Swamps and wetlands were once considered wasteland, undesirable,
and not picturesque. But as the people became more sophisticated, an
appreciation was acquired that swamps and wetlands serve a vital role
in nature, are part of the balance of nature and are essential to the purity of the water in our lakes and streams.
Id.; see also, Oliver A. Houck, More Unfinished Stories: Lucas, Atlanta Coalition, and
Palila/Sweet Home, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 331, 331 (2004) (stating that “[l]awsuits
placed the issue [of environmental protection] on the national agenda half a century
ago, and lawsuits since have prodded it forward over stiff resistance”).
20
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007 (“South Carolina’s expressed interest in intensively
managing development activities in the so-called ‘coastal zone’ dates from 1977
when, in the aftermath of Congress’s passage of the federal Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 . . . the legislature enacted a Coastal Zone Management Act of its
own.”); see also Sax, Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 6, at 473 (“Public concern about
environmental quality is beginning to be felt in the courtroom.”).
21
For an early review by the Supreme Court of decisions addressing the scope of
a state’s police powers, see Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 658–59 (1887) (including
within the scope of state police powers regulation of a state’s “domestic commerce,
contracts, the transmission of estates, real and personal, and acts upon internal matters which relate to its moral and political welfare” as well as “every law for the restraint of and punishment of crime, for the preservation of the public peace, health,
and morals” (internal citations omitted)). Almost forty years later, the Supreme
Court definitively held that land regulations were within a State’s police powers. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
22
DAVID SLADE, R. KERRY KEHOE & JANE K. STAHL, COASTAL STATES ORG., PUTTING
THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK 4 (1990) [hereinafter SLADE ET AL.] (“It is often stated that the Public Trust Doctrine dates back to the sixth century Institutes
of Justinian and the accompanying Digest, which collectively formed Roman civil
law, . . . . [however these] were based, often verbatim, upon the second century Institutes and Journals of Gaius . . . .”).
23
See Sax, Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 6, at 474 (advocating an expansive approach to the public trust doctrine “as a tool of general application for citizens seeking to develop a comprehensive legal approach to resource management problems”).
19
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public trust doctrine stands for the principle that land bordering
navigable water belongs to the public and encumbers any future con24
veyance. A government therefore has the affirmative duty to protect
25
public trust lands; if it fails to do so, a member of the public may
26
have standing to sue the government for failing its fiduciary duty.
Ironically, many government regulations enacted as a direct response
to public demand and increased environmental awareness came up

24

Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894). Although the definition for the public
trust doctrine has varied through the years, the Supreme Court in Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Mississippi, recognized Shively v. Bowlby, as the “seminal case in American public
trust jurisprudence.” Phillips Petroleum Co., 484 U.S. 469, 473 (1988). Shively described the public trust doctrine as “title and dominion in lands flowed by the tide
water . . . [held by] the King for the benefit of the nation . . . . [which] [u]pon the
American Revolution . . . vested in the original States . . . .” 152 U.S. at 57; see also Ill.
Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892) (“It is settled law of this country
that the ownership of . . . lands covered by tide waters . . . belong to the respective
States within which they are found, with the consequent right to use or dispose of . . .
without substantial impairment of the interest of the public . . . .”). Matthews v. Bay
Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984), is generally thought of as the seminal case reinstating the public trust doctrine into the lexicon of modern property
law, and defines the public trust doctrine similarly to Shively, as “acknowledg[ing]
that the ownership, dominion and sovereignty over land flowed by tidal waters, which
extend to the mean high water mark, is vested in the State in trust for the people.”
Matthews, 471 A.2d at 358; see also Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 51
(N.J. 1972) (“That broad doctrine derives from the ancient principle of English law
that land covered by tidal waters belonged to the sovereign, but for the common use
of all the people.”); SLADE ET AL., supra note 22, at 1 (“The Public Trust Doctrine provides that public trust lands, waters and living resources in a State are held by the
state in trust for the benefit of all of the people, and establishes the right of the public to fully enjoy public trust lands, waters and living resources for a wide variety of
recognized public uses.”); see generally Sax, Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 6 (exploring the different definitions given to the public trust doctrine).
25
E.g., Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wis. 1972) (stating that
the public trust is an “active . . . duty . . . [which] requires the state not only to promote navigation but also to protect and preserve those waters” for public benefit);
CAROL M. ROSE, The Comedy of the Commons, in PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON
THE HISTORY, THEORY AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 110 (1994) (“[T]he ‘trust’ language of public property doctrine . . . suggested that governments had duties to preserve the property of what some cases called the ‘unorganized’ public.”).
26
Compare Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 381 (Cal. 1971) (holding that a private citizen has standing), Paepcke v. Pub. Bldg. Comm’n of Chicago, 263 N.E.2d 11,
18 (Ill. 1970) (“If the ‘public trust’ doctrine is to have any meaning or vitality at all,
the members of the public, at least taxpayers who are the beneficiaries of that trust,
must have the right and standing to enforce it.”), with Scott v. Chicago Part Dist., 360
N.E.2d 773, 775 (Ill. 1977) (noting that even though a citizen does not have standing
to sue directly, dismissals of suits for lack of standing do not bar the State Attorney
General from bringing suit); Belford v. City of New Haven, 364 A.2d 194, 198 (Conn.
1975) (holding that “a private individual cannot maintain a bill to enjoin a breach of
public trust, in the absence of statutory authority”) (quoting McCormick v. Chicago
Yacht Club, 163 N.E. 418, 420 (Ill. 1928)).
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against the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. The principle set
forth by the Supreme Court in Lucas, that a prohibition on all land
28
development triggered compensation, was and continues to be particularly problematic in regards to environmental regulations that
29
prohibit or severely limit development on coastal lands.
Courts have attempted to get around Lucas in many creative
ways, such as noting that a bare minimal economic benefit is left to
30
the landowner, or fitting the regulation into the Lucas exceptions of
31
“background principles of property law.” Some recent cases have
even hinted at another means to bypass the inflexible Lucas standard—the survival of the “investment-backed expectations” Penn Cen32
tral factor, but have refused to directly address this possibility, hold27

E.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992). But see, e.g.,
Just, 201 N.W.2d at 765, 767–68 (upholding a regulation “to aid in the fulfillment of
the state’s role as trustee of its navigable waters” because the regulation did not take
“a benefit not presently enjoyed by the public for its use” but merely maintained “the
natural status quo of the environment”). See generally Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private
Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 149 (1971) [hereinafter, Sax, Public Rights]
(noting that the “interest in environmental quality . . . spawned various attempts at
property regulation, many of which actually or potentially collide with the takings
provision”); Houck, supra note 19, at 340 (emphasizing that the South Carolina regulation at issue in Lucas was in response to serious erosion concerns and noting that
the legislation was in compliance with the Federal Coastal Zone Management Act).
28
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
29
See generally Joseph L. Sax, Using Property Rights to Attack Environmental Protection,
19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 715 (2002) [hereinafter Sax, Using Property Rights]; Houck, supra note 19, at 340. The critique of the focus on economic devaluation predates Lucas. Sax, Public Rights, supra note 27, at 172 (“[T]he current takings scheme introduces an irrationality by requiring compensation when the conflict resolution system
imposes extreme economic harm on discrete users but not when analogous harm is
placed on diffuse users.”).
30
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
330 (2002) (emphasizing “that the categorical rule would not apply if the diminution
in value were 95% instead of 100%”) (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8); Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 616 (2001) (remanding for consideration under the
Penn Central balancing test rather than the Lucas categorical takings rule “because the
value of upland portions [of the landowner’s property] is substantial”).
31
See, e.g., Esplanade Prop., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir.
2002); Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112, 125 (N.J.
2005); McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 120 (S.C. 2003), cert. denied,
540 U.S. 982 (2003). Nuisance law, the law of custom and the public trust doctrine
are examples of “background principles.” David L. Callies, Nuisance and Background
Principles: The Lucas Exceptions, SJ052 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 473 (2004).
32
McQueen, 580 S.E.2d at 119 n.5 (noting that “Lucas left much confusion . . .
about whether another Penn Central factor, ‘investment-backed expectations,’ survived in the context of a total deprivation case”); see also Esplanade, 307 F.3d at 984
(taking judicial notice of the fact that a developer purchased the land in question at
a bargain price, even though broadly stating that “the multi-factor analysis established in Penn Central” is inapplicable).
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ing instead that the public trust doctrine saved the regulations at is33
sue from requiring compensation.
34
In McQueen v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the South Carolina
Supreme Court found that a compensable taking had not taken place
even where it was “uncontested that McQueen’s lots retain[ed] no
35
value.” The South Carolina Supreme Court’s decision was based on
36
the public trust doctrine. The facts of McQueen were similar to the
facts of Lucas; in both cases, private property owners protested regulations prohibiting all development on their property, where surrounding lots had already been developed and therefore practically
37
unaffected by the regulations.
In another recent case, Esplanade
38
Properties, LLC v. City of Seattle, the petitioners attempted to develop
land “on and over tidelands located . . . near both a large city park
39
and a large marina.” In Esplanade, the developers proposed to build
40
residential housing “on platforms supported by pilings.” Although
the courts in both cases ultimately found that the public trust doc41
trine allowed regulation without compensation, the visual cues of
the land proposed for development were different—one dealt with
lots surrounded by developed land, the other surrounded by land
42
mostly undeveloped.
This Comment will argue that instead of stretching the legal
boundaries of the exceptions to the Lucas categorical rule, especially
in regards to the expanding use of the public trust doctrine, Lucas

33

McQueen, 580 S.E.2d at 120.
580 S.E.2d 116 (S.C. 2003).
35
Id. at 119.
36
Id. at 120 (holding that “[t]he tidelands included on McQueen’s lots are public trust property subject to control of the State”).
37
Compare id. at 118 (“McQueen purchased two non-contiguous lots located on
manmade saltwater canals in the Cherry Grove section of North Myrtle Beach. . . .
The lots surrounding McQueen’s are improved . . . .”), with Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1008 (1992) (describing the two lots at issue as within “extensive residential development . . . . located approximately 300 feet from the
beach”).
38
307 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2002).
39
Id. at 980.
40
Id.
41
McQueen, 580 S.E.2d at 150; Esplanade, 307 F.3d at 987.
42
McQueen, 580 S.E.2d at 118; Esplande, 307 F.3d at 980. Although not addressing the public trust doctrine, the case of Bowles v. United States also helps to highlight
the importance of visual cues in property law. 31 Fed. Cl. 37 (1994). In Bowles, the
court held the denial of a permit to fill land had accomplished a Lucas categorical
taking, emphasizing that “[a]ll Mr. Bowles wanted to do was the same exact use as his
surrounding neighbors; build a home in a residential subdivision.” Id. at 46.
34
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should be interpreted (or reformulated) to incorporate “investment-backed expectations” as informed by visual cues. Because expectations reflect common notions of justice, this solution will allow
enough flexibility for governments to further the public interest
without upsetting the public’s perception of secure and stable property rights. Furthermore, this Comment will argue that the state of
prior development on land or the changing topography of land is an
acceptable means to determine when compensation is necessary because such cues directly inform the public’s reasonable expectations.
Regard to visual cues will also serve to anchor and limit the potential
for extreme vagueness in a rule based on expectations.
Part I of this Comment will trace the history of takings jurisprudence, outlining the rationale behind the compensation requirement
and the emergence of “investment-backed expectations.” Part II will
trace the history of the public trust doctrine and its uneasy fit within
regulatory takings jurisprudence. Part III will compare recent cases,
including McQueen and Esplanade, that have skirted around Lucas by
using the public trust doctrine. Part III will also argue that grounding the public trust doctrine with visual cues and general “investmentbacked expectations” will make the doctrine more compatible with
accepted notions of justice, thus leading to a regulatory takings jurisprudence that is more widely perceived as “fair.”
I.

PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LIMITATIONS: THE PERPLEXING SIMPLICITY
OF EMINENT DOMAIN & THE NOT-SO-SIMPLE REGULATORY
TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE

Implicit in the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause is the recognition that private property rights would sometimes need to give way to
44
the public good. The problem with this deceptively simple rule is
that no society is ever completely of one mind, and any change, even
43

Most commentators are adamant that Justice Scalia, in writing the Lucas opinion, meant to completely eradicate any vestiges of the Penn Central factors when dealing with economic wipeout cases. See, e.g., Odabashian, supra note 7, at 664 (“Scalia
determines . . . that in at least those cases in which all economically viable use of the
land is destroyed, the Court need not look at investment-backed expectations at
all.”); see also Hulsebosch, supra note 5, at 721 (“Justice Scalia advocated a fixed conception [of background principles of property law] and disagreed with the evolutionary conception of Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and Stephen Breyer.”).
44
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). Even the Supreme Court decision in Lucas acknowledged that landowners expected restrictions in the name of
the State’s police powers. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992)
(“[T]he property owner necessarily expects the uses of his property to be restricted,
from time to time, by various measures newly enacted by the State in legitimate exercise of its police powers.”).
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if in the interest of justice, no matter how incremental, will affront at
45
Therefore, questions of
least one member of any given society.
when it is appropriate that public interests prevail over private rights
46
have plagued the doctrine since its inception. The Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence on takings is an attempt to find a compromise between
47
advancing the public good and vindicating private rights. Compen48
sation is a means to achieve this balance. However, to say that compensation is the answer would be to state a mere tautology. The
question remains the same: Under what circumstances does the concept of fairness require compensation when a landowner’s property
interests have been affected by government action? As a starting
point, the answer depends on the characterization of the government
49
action. Has the government physically appropriated property or has
it passed a law regulating property? Physical appropriation of property by the government falls under the relatively clear doctrine of
eminent domain, while everything else falls under the unwieldy doc50
trine of regulatory takings.

45

See Treanor, The Origins, supra note 2, at 705–06 (tracing the genesis of the
Takings Clause, and noting a general rejection of the existence of “a readily discernible common good” and that the few states which included a just compensation
clause before the adoption of the Bill of Rights did so on “the new insight that society
was composed of groups whose interests irreconcilably diverged”).
46
See, e.g., Poirier, Virtue of Vagueness, supra note 14, at 97 (“In judicial opinion
and academic assessment alike, it seems almost de rigueur to include at least one or
two choice sentences of complaint [about the regulatory takings doctrine] . . . .”).
47
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1165 (1967) (referring to
the Takings Jurisprudence as “essentially engaged in deciding when government may
execute public programs while leaving associated costs disproportionately concentrated upon one or a few persons”); see also Hulsebosch, supra note 5, at 716.
48
Michelman, supra note 47, at 1180 (“[C]ompensation payments have something to do with maintaining at an acceptable level the assurance that benefits and
burdens will be evenly distributed over the long run.”) (emphasis added).
49
Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 523 (1992); see also Joseph L. Sax, Takings and
the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 62–63 (1964) [hereinafter Sax, Police Power] (classifying government action as either enterprise or mediation and requiring compensation only if the government acts as an enterprise). In a subsequent article, Sax
shifted his focus away from the enterprise/mediation categorization to focus on
property use, but the initial classification, though no longer central, remained in the
background. Sax, Public Rights, supra note 27, at 151.
50
Yee, 503 U.S. at 523 (“The first category of cases [physical appropriations] requires courts to apply a clear rule; the second [involving regulatory takings] necessarily entails complex factual assessments of the purposes and economic effects of government actions.”).
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A. Eminent Domain—Compensation Expected and Granted
Eminent domain is the inherent power of the federal, state, or
local governments, as “sovereign” entities, to condemn private prop51
erty against the will of the individual for public use. This power of
the government has generally been accepted as necessary, although
the scope of the power is often the subject of dispute and varying ju52
53
dicial interpretations. While the definition of “public use” or the
54
value of “just” compensation has been fiercely litigated, one aspect
of eminent domain has remained consistent: A physical taking, no
55
matter how de minimus, requires compensation. The classic example
51

E.g., Johnston v. Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 252 So. 2d 75, 76 (Ala. 1971); Haig v.
Wateree Power Co., 112 S.E. 55, 57 (S.C. 1922).
52
E.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2665 (2005) (giving broad
deference to local governments in determining whether eminent domain is justified); Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich.
1981) (same), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich.
2004) (placing limitations on the government’s discretion based on state constitutional grounds). The controversy surrounding eminent domain proceedings is not a
question of whether compensation should be paid—that compensation is due is
never questioned when the government has physically appropriated private property.
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (“In general (at least with
regard to permanent invasions), no matter how minute the intrusion, and no matter
how weighty the public purpose behind it, we have required compensation.”); see also
Michelman, supra note 47, at 1184 (“[C]ourts . . . never deny compensation for a
physical takeover.”). Instead, the controversy surrounding eminent domain proceedings regards the definition of “public use.” Initially, state courts had systematically
ruled that local governments had broad deference in deciding the scope of the definition. E.g., Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 458, overruled by Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 784;
Kelo, 843 A.2d 500, 525–26 (Conn. 2004), aff’d by 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2665 (2005). The
Supreme Court approved this deferential standard in Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff. 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984). However, Midkiff did not calm the controversy,
and more than twenty years later, the Supreme Court reinforced its decision in Midkiff by finding in Kelo v. City of New London that an economic rejuvenation plan, where
private property was condemned and transferred to private parties, was within the
permissible scope of “public use.” Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665. However, that Supreme
Court decision left room for the state supreme courts to limit government eminent
domain powers under state constitutions. See, e.g., Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 784.
53
See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
54
It is generally accepted that “just compensation” equals fair market value, e.g.,
United States v. John J. Felin & Co., 334 U.S. 624, 644 (1948) (Reed, J., concurring);
however, the debate surrounds whether there is a discernable market price, what factors into the market price, and if there is no discernable market price, what other
factors can determine the value of “just compensation.” Id. See generally Poirier,
Regulatory Takings, supra note 1, at §§ 10A.18[1][b]–[g] (discussing what factors into
the valuation of just compensation).
55
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
322 (2002) (“When the government physically takes possession of an interest in
property for some public purpose, it has a categorical duty to compensate the former
owner . . . .”) (citing United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115 (1951)); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015; Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
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of this decree at work is the ruling in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
56
CATV Corp., which found that even the placement of a cable box
and wires on property required compensation, notwithstanding the
fact that the encroachment was barely noticeable and that fair market
57
value was either not affected at all or only negligibly affected.
Commentators have repeatedly puzzled over why this rule is so adamantly protected by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Con58
stitution. Perhaps it is because the Fifth Amendment’s language,
“nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just com59
60
pensation,” seems deceptively clear. Perhaps too, it is because historically, the Fifth Amendment was meant to protect just that—
61
physical appropriations. Or maybe, the answer is simply that physical invasions are so tangible and visible that even though a particular
appropriation may not result in monetary devaluation, allowing a
physical invasion without demanding some kind of recompense
would seriously undervalue closely held notions of security—both
62
private and public expectations. Whatever rationale chosen, courts
have consistently found that any time the government encroaches on
property physically and permanently, it would be unjust to deny
63
compensation.

434–35 (1982) (“In short, when the ‘character of the governmental action,’ is a permanent physical occupation of property, our cases uniformly have found a taking to
the extent of the occupation, without regard to whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner.” (internal citations omitted)).
56
458 U.S. 419 (1982).
57
Id. at 434–35.
58
Michelman, supra note 47, at 1185 (“[T]he magic of physical invasion is rooted
in wordplay . . . . [that] begins to fail as soon as we press on to a modest level of lingual sophistication.”). For an excellent discussion of the weaknesses of the Taking
Clause’s historical anchor, see William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of
the Takings Clause and The Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995). In this article, William Treanor notes that at the time the Fifth Amendment was adopted,
“[e]ven with respect to physical seizures of property by the government, the compensation requirement was not generally recognized . . . .” Id. at 785.
59
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
60
Michelman, supra note 47, at 1185.
61
Treanor, The Origins, supra note 2, at 708 (“Madison intended the clause to
have narrow legal consequences: It was to apply only to the federal government and
only to physical takings.”).
62
ROSE, Seeing Property, supra note 11, at 269 (“Physical characteristics are often
visible. Perhaps this helps to explain why, for example, issues of governmental ‘takings’ are so notoriously sensitive when they concern what are called ‘physical invasions’ of property . . . .”).
63
See Michelman, supra note 47, at 1184.
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B. Regulatory Taking—The Propriety of Compensation Questioned
Regulatory takings jurisprudence is fraught with inconsistencies
64
and inadequacies. Unlike cases involving eminent domain, when it
comes to regulatory takings law, the language of the Fifth Amend65
ment does not provide much guidance. In fact, it was not until 1922
66
that the Supreme Court, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, recognized that anything other than physical appropriations fell within the
ambit of the Takings Clause, and held “that while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be rec67
ognized as a taking.” This basic rule promulgated by Pennsylvania
Coal is hazy; the boundaries of what is “too far” are the subject of con68
stant litigation. Even in Pennsylvania Coal, the Court identified the
potential problems of extending takings claims to regulations prom69
ulgated according to the states’ valid police power. Specifically, the
Court recognized that “[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some
extent values incident to property could not be diminished without
70
paying for every such change in the general law.” Furthermore, the
Court acknowledged that legal property rights are not and have never
been interpreted as absolute, stating, “[a]s long recognized, some values
are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police
71
power.”
Since Pennsylvania Coal, the Supreme Court has repeatedly attempted to formulate clear guidelines for determining when com64

See Sax, Police Power, supra note 49, at 37.
Treanor, The Origins, supra note 2, at 711.
66
260 U.S. 393 (1922).
67
Id. at 415.
68
For example, there is a long list of leading cases developing the regulatory takings jurisprudence after regulatory takings was originally acknowledged in Pennsylvania Coal. In chronological order, those cases are: Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926) (holding that zoning ordinances are not per se unconstitutional); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)
(establishing a balancing test between the public interest, “distinct investmentbacked expectations,” and the extent of the “economic impact of the regulation”);
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992) (holding that a regulation
working a total economic wipeout is a per se compensable taking); Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island, 533 U.S. 606, 628 (2001) (holding that preexistence of regulations at the time
property is acquired does not bar a takings claim); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v.
Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 341–42 (2002) (holding that temporary
development moratoria are not per se unconstitutional).
69
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
70
Id. at 413. The Supreme Court proved its commitment to this principle in
holding that zoning regulations, although severely limiting property use in some
cases, were not per se takings. Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 397.
71
Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 413 (emphasis added).
65
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pensation is required, not for physical appropriations, but for when a
government legitimately uses its police power to regulate property in
72
its jurisdiction. But the clarity seemingly established in any one Su73
preme Court case is inevitably criticized as illusory. The Court itself
has acknowledged the difficulty of formulating bright line rules and
74
even its reluctance to do so. It is not surprising, then, that the current test for determining how far is really “too far,” is one that incorporates the original balancing test of Pennsylvania Coal, which identified the following factors: (1) “the extent of the diminution,” in
“values incident to property;” (2) “[t]he extent of the public interest,” and; (3) whether or not the particular regulation at issue conferred an “average reciprocity of advantage” on the burdened prop75
erty owner.
The Court fine-tuned this test in Penn Central
76
Transportation Co. v. City of New York. The Penn Central test added a
crucial element to these factors—it introduced “investment-backed
77
expectations” into the equation. The Penn Central balancing test,
which courts currently apply, weighs the following factors: (1) “economic impact of the regulation on the claimant;” (2) “the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations;” and (3) “the character of the governmental action,”
including whether the regulation was “reasonably necessary to the ef78
fectuation of a substantial public purpose.” Naturally, a balancing

72

See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
E.g., Sax, Police Power, supra note 49, at 37 (“In some specific instances [whether
compensation is implicated] has become clear . . . . [However,] the predominant
characteristic of this area of law is a welter of confusing and apparently incompatible
results.”).
74
See, e.g., Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 37, 39 (1994) (“Courts . . . cannot
produce comprehensive solutions. They can only interpret the rather precise language of the fifth amendment . . . in very specific factual circumstances.”). In an attempt to formulate one such bright line rule, in 1992, the Supreme Court in Lucas,
developed the economic wipeout test; however, in an opinion a decade later, the
Court emphasized the narrow scope of the Lucas rule. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council,
Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 326 (2002) (“[W]e still resist the
temptation to adopt per se rules in our cases involving partial regulatory takings, preferring to examine ‘a number of factors’ rather than a simple ‘mathematically precise’ formula.”). See also Sax, Police Power, supra note 49, at 37 (“[T]he Supreme
Court] has developed the habit of introducing its uniformly unsatisfactory opinions
in this area with the understatement that ‘no rigid rules’ or ‘set formula’ are available . . . .” (internal citations omitted)).
75
Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 413–15.
76
438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); see also Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 393.
77
Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
78
Id. at 124–27.
73
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test does not result in any bright line rules; instead the outcome of
79
each claim is fact specific.
The balancing test reformulated in Penn Central, however, did
not eliminate the public’s desire or demand for bright line rules. In
1992, the Supreme Court carved out one arguably clear rule for when
80
a “regulation goes too far.” In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Coun81
cil, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, announced the following
categorical rule: “[W]hen the owner of real property has been called
upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the
common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has
82
suffered a taking,” without regard to “the public interest ad83
vanced.” This categorical rule equates some limited types of regula84
tions to a physical invasion.
While, at first blush, this rule appears innovative, the essence of
85
the rule existed in the early Penn Central analysis. The fact that a
regulation works a complete economic wipeout on a landowner triggers the first and second Penn Central factors—economic impact and
86
investment backed expectations. Although Lucas explicitly directs
that the third prong—the public interest—is not to be weighed
against a landowner’s interest, the impact of Lucas on the Penn Central
87
test is dubious.
The circumstances under which the Lucas rule
would apply, complete economic wipeout and annihilation of an
owner’s investment-backed expectations, heavily favor the landowner’s interests. Therefore, even if the Penn Central test applied, the
public interest would have to be great indeed in order to outweigh
79

See Poirier, Regulatory Takings, supra note 1, at §§ 10A.04, 10A-17 (“[The] fact
specific inquiry mandated by Penn Central and its progeny . . . . [i]n most cases . . . is
unavoidable.”). The principle of “ad-hoc, factual inquiries” was criticized in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992), yet championed in TahoeSierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 327
(2002).
80
Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 415.
81
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
82
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.
83
Id. at 1015–16.
84
Id.
85
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127–28 (1978) (reasoning that where a statute has “nearly the same effect as the complete destruction of
[property] rights . . . the statute was invalid as effecting a ‘taking’ without just compensation”). The Penn Central Court even cites a 1908 case that expounded the same
rule—specifically, that if a “restriction makes property wholly useless ‘the rights of
property . . . prevail over the other public interest’ and compensation is required.”
Id. at 128 (quoting Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908)).
86
See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
87
Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 37, 46 (1994).
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the overwhelming detriment to the landowner and defeat the conclusion that a taking had occurred. Furthermore, although not obvious,
the exception carved out in Lucas inherently considers the public in88
terest, at least to a certain extent. This exception is set forth in the
rule that where the regulation merely reflects “background principles
of the State’s law of property and nuisance,” the Takings Clause does
not require compensation, no matter the extent of economic depri89
vation. Considering that “background principles” of property law
consist, for the most part, of regulations enacted pursuant to a State’s
90
police power, which in turn is the power to act in the public inter91
est, the Lucas exception may in fact reintroduce the very factor it
purports to do away with. The fact that courts are increasingly acknowledging the public trust doctrine as a background principle of
property law reinforces the conclusion that Lucas is not such a bright
line rule after all.
Taking aside whether Lucas truly eradicated the “public interest”
Penn Central factor, another question remained: Lucas was unclear as
to whether, in order to claim compensation, an affected property
92
owner had to have distinct “investment-backed expectations.” Re93
cent cases suggest an affirmative answer. The unanswered questions
of Lucas had the ironic effect of making the doctrine closer to the
88

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030 (“The ‘total taking’ inquiry we require today will ordinarily entail . . . analysis of, among other things, the degree of harm to public lands
and resources . . . .”).
89
Id. at 1029.
90
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
91
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
92
McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 119 n.5 (S.C. 2003) (“Lucas
left much confusion . . . about whether another Penn Central factor, ‘investmentbacked expectations,’ survived in the context of a total deprivation case.”). This confusion can be traced back to the opinions in Lucas. For example, Justice Scalia, writing the opinion in Lucas highlighted the fact that Lucas had purchased the property
with the intention to develop it. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1008. Furthermore, Justice Kennedy in his concurrence noted that the initial determination of whether a regulation
at issue deprived the property of all value depends upon the landowner’s reasonable
expectations. Id. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The finding of no value must
be considered under the Takings Clause by reference to the owner’s reasonable, investment-backed expectations.”); see also Esplanade Prop., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307
F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2002) (taking judicial notice of the fact that a developer purchased the land in question at a bargain price, even though broadly stating that “the
multi-factor analysis established in Penn Central” is inapplicable).
93
McQueen, 580 S.E.2d at 119 n.5; Esplanade, 307 F.3d at 984; Westside Quick
Shop, Inc. v. Stewart, 534 S.E.2d 270, 275 (S.C. 2000). But see Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 231 F.3d 1354, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[W]hen a regulatory
taking, properly determined to be ‘categorical,’ is found to have occurred, the property owner is entitled to a recovery without regard to consideration of investmentbacked expectations.”).
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Penn Central test in its practical application. Notwithstanding these
unanswered questions, regulatory takings jurisprudence before Lucas
seemed to at least have had the appearance of manageability, if not
quite predictability: If a case involved total taking, compensation
would be required in all but narrow exceptions; if a partial taking oc95
curred, the Penn Central test would continue to be applied.
This token clarity was upset yet again in a 2001 Supreme Court
96
case, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. The Palazzolo case dealt with a partial
97
taking, and was thus outside of the realm of Lucas, yet its implications regarding the perseverance of “investment-backed expectations”
are worth noting. The Court ruled that even though the petitioner,
Anthony Palazzolo, acquired title to the land after a regulation had
98
been in place, his takings claim was not automatically barred. This
rule, at first blush, seems contrary to the concept of “investmentbacked expectations,” as it was commonly thought that prior notice
99
of property restrictions made certain expectations unreasonable.
Justice Kennedy, however, justified the need for such a rule, because
to hold otherwise would allow “[a] State . . . to put an expiration date
100
on the Takings Clause.”

94

See, for example, the United States Court of Federal Claims’ regulatory taking
analysis in Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 37 (1994), which although held that the
regulation had effectuated a total taking, nevertheless proceeded to analyze the facts
under both the Lucas and Penn Central tests, concluding that “the facts of this case
require just compensation under either analysis.” Bowles, 31 Fed. Cl. at 46.
95
McQueen, 580 S.E.2d at 119.
96
533 U.S. 606 (2001).
97
Id. at 631–632.
98
Id. at 628.
99
See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 47, at 1213 (arguing that compensation is only
necessary to maintain societal morale, which will in turn lead to an efficient society).
In his seminal article, Property, Utility, and Fairness, Frank I. Michelman explained that
a society would suffer through demoralization when it saw one of its members as a
targeted “victim[] of unprincipled exploitation,” resulting in the fear that at any
moment any one of its members could become such a target by legislative design. Id.
at 1230. Further, Michelman noted that all tests employed by courts in regulatory
takings claims attempted to determine “whether or not the measure in question can
easily be seen to have practically deprived the claimant of some distinctly perceived,
sharply crystallized, investment-backed expectation.” Id. at 1233. Michelman rationalized the stress on a clear manifestation of an owner’s expectations by stating that
the “land speculator who is unable to show that he has yet formed any specific plans
for his vacant land still has a package of possibilities with its value, though lessened,
still unspecified—which is what he had before.” Id. at 1234 (emphasis added). This
leads to the conclusion that if a regulation restricted property use before the owner
took title to undeveloped property, then he could not have had any expectations as
to that use.
100
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627.
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Justice O’Connor, in her concurrence, attempted to reconcile
the expectations factor with the seemingly inapposite holding of Pa101
lazzolo.
By stating that “the regulatory regime in place at the time
the claimant acquires the property at issue helps to shape the reasonableness of those expectations,” Justice O’Connor noted that prior
102
notice was not irrelevant to the analysis. To imply otherwise would
have been contrary to public perceptions of justice: “[I]f existing
regulations do nothing to inform the analysis, then some property
owners may reap windfalls and an important indicia of fairness is
103
lost.” Although Justice O’Connor’s analysis dealt with a partial taking, this statement, regarding the importance of the regulatory
scheme in place at the time the owner takes title, can be applied with
equal force to a total takings case, where a property owner who
bought land subject to certain regulations probably did so at a bar104
gain price. In such a case, justice would not mandate that the government pay for a landowner’s inability to develop, and in fact, would
105
even militate against it.
The Supreme Court’s repeated emphasis on the factual nature
of the regulatory takings inquiry further weighs in favor of extending
106
the expectations factor to total takings cases. Although bright line
rules may be desirable, such rules should only be employed in a small
number of cases, where the taking seems so obvious that no controversy really exists—in other words, where the justice in granting compensation is generally accepted. Such is the nature of the bright line
101

Id. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Hulsebosch, supra note 5, at 727
(noting that Justice O’Connor’s approach leaves open the possibility “that a regulation effecting a taking from present holders might someday be assimilated into the
background principals of property law so that some or all post-enactment acquirers
would not succeed with takings claims”).
102
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
103
Id. at 635. But see id. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The ‘investment-backed
expectations’ that the law will take into account do not include the assumed validity
of a restriction that in fact deprives property of so much of its value as to be unconstitutional.”). Justice Scalia would advocate that no windfall occurs because although
prior regulations should not play a role in determining whether a “taking” has occurred, it does play a vital role in determining damages. See, e.g., Palm Beach Isles
Assocs. v. United States, 231 F.3d 1354, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Once a taking has
been found, the use restrictions on the property are one of the factors that are taken
into account in determining damages due the owner.”).
104
See, e.g., Esplanade Prop., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 986 (9th Cir.
2002) (noting that the developer purchased the coastal land in 1991 for “only
$40,000”); Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“At the time
he bought the subject parcel, Appellant acknowledged both the necessity and the
difficulty of obtaining regulatory approval.”).
105
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 635 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
106
See supra note 79.

RUIZ FINAL

2006]

5/30/2006 9:23:45 PM

COMMENT

1327

107

rule regarding physical invasions. The categorical rule in Lucas also
came about in a case where the reasonable expectations of the landowner were not questioned. The regulation at issue was enacted after
Lucas had purchased the property specifically for residential devel108
opment. Furthermore, the lots surrounding Lucas’s particular lots
had been developed and were not affected by the regulation at issue—thus visually, the public could literally see that Lucas was shouldering a disproportionate part of the common burden—the empty
109
lot a reminder of the right “taken.”
Even though the reasonable
expectations factor was not explicit in the Lucas test (and was in fact
denied), the rule that resulted in compensation for Lucas complied
with both public and private expectations. Further, Lucas’s private
expectation included not only his own personal expectations, but also
included the individual expectations of other members of the public
110
who empathized with Lucas.
II. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE—A DOCTRINE OF EXPECTATIONS?
The public trust doctrine has its origins in the ancient Roman
111
ideal of jus publicum—the notion of the “public right.” This principle was carried over into English law, where submerged and tidal
112
lands were owned by the King and open to the public. With the independence of the United States, the ownership of public trust lands
vested in the public, to be administered by the elected State govern113
ments.
Although the doctrine was recognized early in U.S. his107

See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1008 (1992). There is no indication that the property was bought at a bargain price, as was noted in other cases, but
rather that Lucas paid a price reflective of the suitability for residential development.
Id. at 1039 n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
109
Id. Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence, highlighted the potential importance
of the developed and non-regulated state of neighboring property lots, stating that
where a regulation unevenly distributed the burden on remaining undeveloped land,
the owner’s reasonable expectations may be thwarted. Id. at 1035–36 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he means, as well as the ends, of regulation must accord with the
owner’s reasonable expectations. Here, the State did not act until after the property
had been zoned for individual lot development and most other parcels had been improved, throwing the whole burden of the regulation on the remaining lots. ”).
110
See Michelman, supra note 47, at 1230; see also supra note 99 and accompanying
text (discussing demoralization costs in takings jurisprudence).
111
See SLADE ET AL., supra note 22, at 6.
112
Id.
113
Id. Further, some states include versions of the public trust doctrine in their
constitutions. Esplanade Prop., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir.
2002) (“The [public trust] doctrine is ‘partially encapsulated in the language of
[Washington’s] constitution which reserves state ownership in “the beds and shores
of all navigable waters in the state.”’” (internal citations omitted)); Pub. Access
108
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tory, it had not been widely used, nor so expansively claimed, so
that the public trust doctrine as it reemerged in the latter half of the
117
twentieth century caught much of the general public by surprise.
This aspect of surprise can be attributed, in part, to the vagueness of
118
the public trust’s scope, especially when compared to fixed notions
Shoreline Haw. v. Haw. County Planning Comm’n., 903 P.2d 1246 (Haw. 1995) (citing to HAW. CONST. art. XII, § 7, which protects “all rights, customarily and traditionally exercised for subsistence, cultural and religious purposes”). Other states refer to
“law of custom” as opposed to the public trust doctrine. E.g., Thornton v. Hay, 462
P.2d 671, 676 (Or. 1969). But the “law of custom” is strikingly similar to the public
trust doctrine, as the rationale behind the law of custom is that rights and access to
certain natural resources have always been enjoyed by the public, thus providing notice to landowners that they are taking the land subject to that custom, and therefore
the right to exclude the public is not part of private property rights. Id. at 678. The
difference between custom and public trust may lie in the theory that custom may be
a more expansive doctrine. See, e.g., Pub. Access Shoreline Haw., 903 P.2d at 1272. The
public trust doctrine is usually only used in reference to lands bordering bodies of
water. See, e.g., McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 118 (S.C. 2003).
For example, in Hawaii, custom is used not only to allow access to water, but also to
allow native Hawaiians access to land anywhere in the state to practice any traditional
Hawaiian right. Pub. Access Shoreline Haw., 903 P.2d at 1272. But see Hawaii v. Hanapi,
970 P.2d 485, 495 n.10 (Haw. 1998) (restricting rights to land that has not been fully
developed and especially restricting rights over residential property).
114
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S.
387, 435 (1892).
115
Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 633 (1986) (arguing
that the public trust doctrine is “resist[ing] a legal system that is otherwise being
abandoned”).
116
For a brief review of the public trust doctrine’s evolution from public necessity
to public leisure, see Raleigh Avenue Beach Ass’n. v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 851 A.2d
19, 27–28 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004), aff’d 879 A.2d 112 (N.J. 2005). New Jersey
is a state that has broadly defined the public trust doctrine. Id. The appellate decision in Raleigh details how the public trust as it was defined by Roman law allowed
public access “to dry . . . [fish] nets there, and haul them from the sea,” and how an
early English case viewed the necessity of beach access as “essential to [the public’s]
welfare.” Id. at 27–28 (quoting the Justinian Institutes and Blundell v. Catterral,
(1821) 106 Eng. Rep. 1190, 1199 (K.B.)). The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed
the appellate decision in Raleigh, which extended the public trust not only for public
recreational uses of the wet sand area, but also to the entire beach itself. Raleigh, 879
A.2d at 124–25.
117
See SLADE ET AL., supra note 22, at 9 (noting how the requirement that private
property owners of public trust land pay property taxes on the land, combined with
the typical silence of deeds as to the public trust or to the exact water boundary,
“lend[s] a certain credence to the private owner’s perception that he or she has sole
possession and control of the property, exclusive of the public”).
118
C.f. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1212 n.4 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“[T]he Supreme Court of Oregon’s vacillations
on the scope of the doctrine of custom make it difficult to say how much of the coast
is covered.”); Thornton, 462 P.2d at 679 (Denecke, J., specially concurring) (“The law
regarding the public use of property held in part for the benefit of the public must
change as the public need changes.” (internal citations omitted)). See also ROSE, su-
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of private property rights and, specifically, the right to exclude oth119
ers. Further, its use to defeat takings claims, even after the supposedly bright line rule declared in Lucas, and its uneasy fit within regu120
latory takings jurisprudence,
adds to the dimension of
unexpectedness.
The infusion of surprise in contemporary invocations of the public trust doctrine is ironic and illustrates the need to turn to visual
cues for a more practical and obvious indicator to decide inverse
condemnation claims. Public trust cases almost without exception
121
highlight the long history of the doctrine. Indeed, courts after Lucas have had to cite to this long history in order to fit the public trust
122
within its “background principal of property law” exception.
The
rationale being that such history is tantamount to prior notice that
certain lands are impressed with the public trust even where they may
123
have been conveyed in fee simple to private entities.
Thus, an
owner cannot claim surprise when the right of exclusion is missing
124
from his or her “bundle of rights.” Yet surprise is at the basis of all
regulatory takings claims—surprise (and indignation) that a society
would restrict a fundamental right.
This underlying paradox is a theme running through the many
legal commentaries that debate whether the public trust doctrine is

pra note 25, at 111 (“[T]he modern public trust doctrine, in spite of its popularity, is
notoriously vague as to its own subject matter . . . .”).
119
See, e.g., Callies, supra note 31, at 488 (emphasizing the importance of limiting
the doctrine of custom because of “the potentially severe impact . . . on property
rights in general, and the right to exclude others in particular”).
120
For example, unlike typical takings claims, where the plaintiff is the private
property owner, public trust cases are instituted by individuals or organizations on
behalf of the public. See, e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n., 471 A.2d
355, 358 (N.J. 1984); Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294
A.2d 47, 55 (N.J. 1972). Therefore, a particular regulation is not scrutinized, but
rather the focus of these cases shifted to the actions of landowners, turning a takings
claim on its head. See, e.g., Matthews, 471 A.2d at 358; Borough of Neptune City, 294
A.2d at 55.
121
E.g., Esplanade Prop., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2002)
(“It is beyond cavil that ‘a public trust doctrine has always existed in Washington.’”);
McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 119 (S.C. 2003) (citing to a South
Carolina Supreme Court decision from 1884); Matthews, 471 A.2d at 360 (citing to
ancient Roman law); Raleigh, 851 A.2d at 27 (citing to ancient Roman law).
122
McQueen, 580 S.E.2d at 120 (holding that Lucas does not require a State to
compensate a landowner “for the denial of permits to do what he cannot otherwise
do”); c.f. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 456 (Or. 1993), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 1207 (1994)) (holding that the law of custom is but a “background principle
of property” and thus survives a Lucas scrutiny).
123
Stevens, 854 P.2d at 457.
124
Id.
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properly identified as a background principle of property law. For
Justice Scalia, the author of the Lucas opinion, this paradox is unac126
ceptable. The exception to Lucas was not meant to be expansively
127
read or used as a sword to defeat public expectations.
Justice
Scalia’s view is made clear in his dissent from the denial of certiorari
128
In Stevens, plaintiffs who owned
of Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach.
oceanfront lots claimed an unconstitutional taking when they were
denied applications to build a seawall that was necessary for the
129
land’s development. At issue was whether the State law of custom,
130
as announced in its 1969 case, Thornton v. Hay, was viable in light of
131
Lucas. In holding that it was, the Oregon State Supreme Court reasoned that Oregon’s law of custom was not a newly legislated law, but
132
rather a background principle of state property law.
Therefore,
even if the law of custom resulted in an economic wipeout, the Oregon State Supreme Court determined that no compensation was due
because the landowners “never had the property interests that they
133
claim were taken by defendant’s decision and regulations.”
In his dissent from denial of certiorari, Justice Scalia sharply
criticized that holding as “invoking nonexistent rules of state substan134
tive law.” He emphasized that the “opinion in Lucas . . . would be a
nullity if anything that a State court chooses to denominate ‘background law’—regardless of whether it is really such—could eliminate
135
property rights.” Despite Justice Scalia’s attempt to clarify the Lucas
opinion, state courts continue to use the public trust doctrine to de136
feat takings claims.

125

See generally Callies, supra note 31; Glenn P. Sugameli, Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council: The Categorical and Other “Exceptions” to Liability for Fifth Amendment
Takings of Private Property Far Outweigh the “Rule,” 29 ENVTL. L. 939 (1999).
126
See Stevens, 510 U.S. at 1207 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
127
Id.
128
854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1207 (1994).
129
Stevens, 510 U.S. at 1207 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
130
462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1967).
131
Stevens, 854 P.2d at 453.
132
Id. at 456.
133
Id. at 457.
134
Stevens, 510 U.S. at 1211 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
135
Id.
136
Esplanade Prop., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 986 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that “Lucas . . . effectively recognized the public trust doctrine” by referring to
State background principles of property law); Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis
Beach Club, Inc., 851 A.2d 19, 32–33 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004), aff’d 879 A.2d
112 (N.J. 2005); McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 120 (S.C. 2003).
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III. VISUAL CUES, EXPECTATIONS & THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE:
THE MEANS TO INSPIRE SECURITY
As previously stated in this Comment, the vagueness of the pub137
lic trust doctrine is a potential source of public unease.
To satisfy
conceptions of justice, the doctrine needs to be perceived as more
concrete. Tying the public trust doctrine with visual cues can help to
inspire a more secure notion of absolute property rights. Two recent
cases, McQueen v. South Carolina Coastal Council and Esplanade Properties, LLC v. City of Seattle, although relying on the public trust doctrine
to defeat a taking, exemplify the importance of visual cues.
Relying on vision as a form of knowledge has been historically
critiqued because of the notion that vision is inflexible and unable to
capture the nuances of life necessary to form a complete understand138
ing of the world. However, it is precisely this perceived inflexibility
that provides reassurance. Even though people are constantly
warned that things are not always as they appear, because of the sheer
139
emphasis in modern society on the visual, a picture is always, and
will continue to be, worth a thousand words. Vision, in reality is contrary to the ideal notion of vision which provides so much security; it
is perhaps the most vulnerable of the senses because our surroundings are in constant flux. The vulnerability lies in the fact that because of the constant changes taking place, we do not consciously take
140
notice of the vast majority of those changes.
A frightening—but
137

See supra notes 8, 118–20 and accompanying text.
ROSE, Seeing Property, supra note 11, at 268. Rose notes with disapproval that
“[a]ccording to some, vision is not the appropriate sense to support persuasive interactions at all. . . . [S]ome scholars have mounted a rather startling attack on vision as
. . . [a] static model for knowledge . . . .” Id.
139
For example, the renowned German social critic and philosopher, Theodor
Adorno, described the origins of modern culture’s reliance on vision to the subordination of all other senses as “the adaptation [of the public] to . . . the age of advanced industry, which was made by the eye when it accustomed itself to perceiving
reality as a reality of objects . . . .” THEODOR ADORNO, IN SEARCH OF WAGNER 99 (Rodney Livingston, trans. 1984) (1952).
140
Nietzsche described this phenomenon as a “crisis of assimilation” where
“[s]ensibility [became] immensely more irritable” due to the physical and rapid
changes created by the Industrial Revolution. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO
POWER 47 (Walter Kaufmann & R.J. Hollingdale, trans., Random House 1967)
(1901). Nietzsche’s eloquent description of this phenomenon evokes his desperation in the failings of vision:
The tempo of this influx [of images] prestissimo; the impressions erase
each other; one instinctively resists taking in anything, taking anything
deeply, to ‘digest’ anything; a weakening of the power to digest results
138
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true—realization is that most people exist in a state of oblivion.
While it has never been the ideal to be considered oblivious, that lack
of perception can ironically help property law become more flexible.
Changes are noted, even if subconsciously, and when a particular
change is pointed out, or noted, whether it be by personal epiphany
or through public outcry, that change is no longer shocking because
it has already been consumed.
Visual cues are even more appropriate to the stabilization of
regulatory takings jurisprudence precisely because so many areas of
142
property law are already dependant on visual cues. This is an elemental concept learned at an early age by children—at least those
who have watched Marvin the Martian race to claim various planets
143
with colorful flags. Whether it is obtaining rights over wild animals
or obtaining rights to land—the surest way to claim possession is
through leaving a visual mark. In McQueen, nature left its visible mark
by flooding previously dry land—that is how the South Carolina Supreme Court was able to proclaim that it was nature and not the state
that took the land. And just like a person can take another’s land
144
through adverse possession, the South Carolina Supreme Court,
with the help of the public trust doctrine, created an analogous doctrine for nature.

from this. A kind of adaptation to the flood of impressions takes place:
men unlearn spontaneous action, they merely react to stimuli from the
outside.
Id.
141

Id. See also JONATHAN CRARY, Modernity and the Problem of the Observer, in
TECHNIQUES OF THE OBSERVER: ON VISION AND MODERNITY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
24 (1990) Although modernity “demolish[ed] the field of classical vision, [it] generated techniques for imposing visual attentiveness, rationalizing sensation, and managing perception . . . . [Such] disciplinary techniques . . . never allowed a real world
to acquire solidity or permanence.” Id.
142
ROSE, Seeing Property, supra note 11, at 269 (“[G]enerally visibility runs through
property law as perhaps no other legal area.”).
143
See JOHN BERGER, WAYS OF SEEING 7 (Penguin Books 1977) (1972) (“Seeing
comes before words. The child looks and recognizes before it can speak.”).
144
Adverse possession is the property law doctrine by which a trespasser can be
vested with legal claim of title to another’s land by the passage of time, as long as the
possession is continuous, open and notorious, actual, and hostile. Marengo Cave Co.
v. Ross, 10 N.E.2d 917 (Ind. 1937). For a more detailed account of adverse possession, see generally Henry W. Ballantine, Title By Adverse Possession, 32 HARV. L. REV.
135 (1918).

RUIZ FINAL

2006]

5/30/2006 9:23:45 PM

COMMENT

1333

A. The Public Trust Doctrine v. Visual Cues: What Will the
Neighbors Say?
Lucas did not discuss the public trust doctrine; it was not necessary before Lucas’s pronouncement of its infamous categorical rule.
However, the South Carolina Supreme Court in McQueen v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, one of the more recent state supreme court
cases to address public expectations and coastal regulations, relied on
the public trust doctrine to save a similar regulation from violating
145
the Fifth Amendment. This begs the question of whether the public trust doctrine, had it been raised, could have saved the regulation
at issue in Lucas. While some visual factors in Lucas and McQueen
overlap, other facts of the two cases created divergent visual effects,
which in turn could have allowed for the same opposite outcomes,
even had Lucas included the public trust doctrine in its analysis. Although in both cases, the land at issue bordered the beach, the
neighboring properties had been fully developed, and a coastal management regulation had rendered the property valueless, analyzing
the differences in the visual cues in the two cases can lead to a better
146
understanding of their polar holdings.
In Lucas, the lots regulated “were located approximately 300 feet
147
from the beach.” In McQueen, the lots at issue “had reverted to tidelands or critical area saltwater wetlands,” with both of Mr. McQueen’s
148
lots subject to tidal flow.
Further, the time between purchase and
149
development was significantly greater in McQueen than in Lucas.
Lucas purchased his lots within an ongoing development project and
commissioned architectural drawings for the lots soon after their
purchase; both these actions were tangible evidence of Lucas’s expec150
tations to “do like his neighbors” and develop his land. When the
regulation prohibiting development passed, the South Carolina Supreme Court characterized Lucas as having “promptly filed [a tak151
ings] suit.” The landowners in McQueen, on the other hand, bought
their lots in the early 1960s and did not attempt to develop until

145

580 S.E.2d 116, 120 (S.C. 2003).
The public trust doctrine was not raised in Lucas; however, this Comment argues that reliance on visual cues would eliminate the need to rely on the public trust
doctrine.
147
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1008 (1992).
148
McQueen, 580 S.E.2d at 118.
149
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006–08; McQueen, 580 S.E.2d at 118.
150
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1008
151
Id. at 1009.
146
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1991, when McQueen filed a series of applications requesting permis152
sion to build bulkheads and backfill the lots.
The visual stories created in Lucas and McQueen, both by the
treatment of the landowners themselves and nature, were vastly different. In regards to Lucas’s land, the public saw an ongoing construction sight, relatively far from the beach, on dry land, amidst a
fully developed residential neighborhood. The expectations not only
of Lucas, but also of the public in regards to that land were thwarted
when a regulation barred all construction. What would have remained had the regulation not been struck down would have been a
gaping hole of dry land amidst the beachfront property. In the case
of McQueen’s lots, the public not only became accustomed to the lots
remaining undeveloped, but also nature had taken its course and re153
claimed the land. While there is a public expectation that land will
be developed, there is no such correlating expectation that the ocean
will be developed. It is in fact the opposite expectation—that bodies
of water will be free from private domain—that is at the core of the
public trust doctrine and the related doctrine of custom. Thus, while
the holding in McQueen was solely based on the public trust doctrine,
it can also be seen as the culmination of public expectations, aided in
part by objective visual cues. It is also significant to note that while
the lots in Lucas had been purchased for close to one million dol154
lars, the two lots in McQueen had been purchased in the 1960s for
less than five thousand dollars, which, even taking into consideration
155
inflation, would still have been a minimal sum.
A brief description of Esplanade, another recent case invoking
the public trust doctrine, also paints a compelling portrait of how
public expectations can be reflected in the denial of compensation
claims. The Ninth Circuit described the lots at issue in Esplanade as
“first class tideland . . . submerged completely for roughly half of the
156
day, during which time it resembles a large sand bar.”
The landowner in Esplanade proposed to construct platforms, supported by pil157
ings, on top of which he would build nine luxury residences. The
land at issue in Esplanade, like in McQueen, was bought at a bargain
152

McQueen, 580 S.E.2d at 118.
Id. at 120. In fact, the South Carolina Supreme Court made a point of stating
that “[a]ny taking McQueen suffered [was] not a taking effected by State regulation
but by the forces of nature and McQueen’s own lack of vigilance in protecting his
property.” Id.
154
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006.
155
McQueen, 580 S.E.2d at 118.
156
Esplanade Prop., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 2002).
157
Id.
153
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price—forty thousand dollars, with a development plan that was likely
158
Unlike McQueen, in Esplanade,
to produce a substantial return.
there was not even the contrary visual effect of neighboring residences to weigh in favor of the plaintiff—only undeveloped land, sur159
rounded by a marina and a city park.
Thus, even though neither the South Carolina Supreme Court
in McQueen, nor the Ninth Circuit reached the issue of whether the
Penn Central reasonable investment-backed expectations factor sur160
vived Lucas, both cases exemplified the need for such an inquiry.
In essence, McQueen is the Lucas case, but with all the presumptions
of the owner’s reasonable expectations stripped away. The Esplanade
case presented an even more dramatic case in which the invocation
of the public trust doctrine vindicated public expectations shaped by
the visual aspect of the land.
B. Public & Private Expectations: What Are My Neighbors Doing?
Neighbors’ actions are social indicators of what is acceptable and
161
what is intolerable. In the realm of takings law, it is therefore not
surprising that neighbors’ visible treatment of their properties have
162
affected the outcome of takings claims. This was a theme running
through Lucas itself, where in setting up the factual context of the
case, Justice Scalia noted that Mr. Lucas’s “intention with respect to
the lots was to do what the owners of the immediately adjacent par163
cels had already done . . . .” Another regulatory takings case shortly

158

Id. at 987.
Id. at 980.
160
McQueen, 580 S.E.2d at 119.
161
See, e.g., Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 37, 43 n.8 (1994) (reprinting, in
part, a letter sent to the plaintiff by the Architectural Commission in regards to the
plaintiff’s development proposal, which explained that filling and sodding would be
necessary and giving as its reasoning their desire to prevent “a precedent which
would allow other potential homeowners to cut corners”). Society’s concern with
placing restrictions on an individual’s property is embodied in zoning laws, and in
the popularity and growth of common interest communities. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 6.2 (2000) (defining “common interest community” as a development or neighborhood where individual lots are burdened with reciprocal servitudes). For an article discussing common interest communities’ misplaced preoccupation with neighbors’ actions, see Paula A. Franzese, Does It Take a
Village? Privatization, Patterns of Restrictiveness and the Demise of Community, 47 VILL. L.
REV. 553, 559 (2002).
162
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1008 (1992).
163
Id.
159

RUIZ FINAL

1336

5/30/2006 9:23:45 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:1309

following Lucas, Bowles v. United States, is even more explicit in ac164
knowledging the role of visual cues.
In Bowles, the plaintiff bought an undeveloped lot within a resi165
dential subdivision upwards of the waterline. In order to begin development, the lot needed to be filled to accommodate a septic sys166
tem.
Although the plaintiff was aware of the need to receive
approval from local regulatory agencies to proceed in developing his
167
lot, he had not been aware that a fill permit from the Army Corps
168
of Engineers was also necessary. At trial, it was established that he
was the only lot owner who had ever been required to apply for such
169
a permit. The Corps denied Mr. Bowles’ application, basing its de170
cision on its jurisdiction to protect wetlands.
In appealing the
Corps’ decision, Mr. Bowles’ argument was essentially, “all my
171
neighbors are doing it, so why can’t I?”
The reasonableness of Mr. Bowles’ expectations, as informed by
the visual cues created by the neighboring property, permeated the
172
Court of Federal Claims’ opinion, which ultimately held in favor of
Mr. Bowles based on both a Penn Central and a Lucas takings analy173
sis. Finding that the taking was categorical, the court noted that the
trial court’s focus on “reasonable investment-backed expectations . . .
174
may have been unnecessary.” Nevertheless, the court proceeded to
analyze the case under both, finding that under either doctrine,
175
compensation was due. In discussing the Lucas “background prin164

Bowles, 31 Fed. Cl. at 46 (“All Mr. Bowles wanted to do was the same exact use
as his surrounding neighbors; build a home in a residential subdivision.”).
165
Id. at 40. Whether the lot was actually part of the residential subdivision was a
disputed fact at the trial court level; however, the court held that, “a reasonable investor would have considered it part of the subdivision.” Id. at 42.
166
Id. at 40.
167
Id. at 42.
168
Id. at 43.
169
Bowles, 31 Fed. Cl. at 43.
170
Id. at 40.
171
Id. This is a paraphrase of the courts language, which states: “Plaintiff argued
that all his neighbors in the subdivision were allowed to place fill on their property
for the purpose of installing septic systems.” Id.
172
See id. at 41, 42, 43 n.9, 46, 51 (alluding to or explicitly addressing Bowles’ reasonable expectations: “Bowles took what he believed to be an opportunity;” “a reasonable investor would have considered [the lot to be within the subdivision];” “[the
evidence] tends to support . . . Bowles [sic] contention that a reasonable purchaser
would have assumed;; “[a]ll Mr. Bowles wanted to do was the same exact use as his
surrounding neighbors;” “the court visited the property and saw nothing that could
reasonably constitute a ‘red flag’”).
173
Id. at 46.
174
Bowles, 31 Fed. Cl. at 46 (internal quotation marks omitted).
175
Id.
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ciple of property law” exception, the court summarily stated that it
was inapplicable, reasoning that “[a]ll Mr. Bowles wanted to do was
the same exact use as his surrounding neighbors; build a home in a
176
residential subdivision” —language remarkably similar to that used
in Lucas. The influence of the surrounding development was clear:
[T]he court visited the property and saw nothing that could reasonably constitute a “red flag” that would justify imputing Bowles
with “notice” of the Corps jurisdiction over Lot 29. If anything,
the opposite was apparent. There are several constructed homes
on the north side of China Clipper Drive on lots virtually identical
to Lot 29. . . . [E]ven after the time of Bowles’ permit denial other
lots within the subdivision were filled in the exact manner Bowles
177
wanted to fill his.

At first blush, the potency of this analysis is diminished after Palazzolo, which held that notice alone would be insufficient grounds
178
for barring a takings claim; however, Palazzolo did nothing to dispute the impact such “red flags” actually have on both private and
179
The Court reasoned that “[p]rospective enpublic expectations.
actment . . . can limit the value of land without effecting a taking be180
cause it can be understood as reasonable by all concerned.” Because the
“all concerned” in a takings claim encompasses both the landowner
and the public, the means by which both can most readily judge reasonableness is the physical aspect of the land at issue.
CONCLUSION
181

Compensation is a means to achieve justice.
The legislature
182
acts on the public’s behalf when it gives compensation; therefore,

176

Id.
Id. at 51.
178
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 628 (2001).
179
See id. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Our polestar . . . remains the principles set forth in Penn Central itself . . . . [I]nterference with investment-backed expectations is one of a number of factors that a court must examine.”).
180
Id. at 627 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
181
Michelman, supra note 47, at 1171–72 (“[T]he only ‘test’ for compensability
which is ‘correct’ in the sense of being directly responsive to society’s purpose in engaging in a compensation practice is the test of fairness: is it fair to effectuate this social measure without granting this claim to compensation for private loss thereby inflicted?”).
182
See, e.g., Bowles, 31 Fed. Cl. at 53 (“A determination that governmental action
constitutes a taking, is, in essence, a determination that the public at large, rather
than a single owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of state power in the public
interest.”).
177
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the act of giving must be perceived as fair by the public. Fairness,
184
in turn, is determined by evaluating the exchange accomplished.
The underlying question humming beneath the public inquiry is
simple: “What are we getting in return for our money?” Because government is meant to serve the practical purpose of civil ordering, the
185
answer should be readily available and obvious.
A citizen should
186
not need to reference abstract rights.
Linking rationales for dispensing or withholding compensation with actual sensory perception
can maintain the steady assurance of justice in society.
In the case of eminent domain, the public has physical and
prominent proof of the exchange. The answer to the question, “what
are we getting,” is the property condemned, available for all to inspect. Further, not only is the physical exchange evidenced, but in
many cases, the rationale for the purchase is physically manifested
through construction that benefits the public. Even in instances of
controversial conveyances to private entities, the argument and ra187
tionale is played out in the press for public consumption.
Thus,
even though a citizen may not agree to the answer given, one is nonetheless provided.
The exchange in regulatory takings cases is more problematic.
In cases not involving complete economic wipeout, just compensation is not accompanied by a reciprocal property interest. The public
trust doctrine is an unsatisfactory doctrine in this regard—a private
landowner does not see fairness in not obtaining compensation for
his inability to exclude others. But neither can the public be forced
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Daniel R. Coquillette, Mosses from an Old Manse: Another Look at Some Historic
Property Cases About the Environment, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 761, 764 (1979) (“Outcomes
[of property rights disputes] must be rationalized to winners and losers alike in terms
of a universal property doctrine that society as a whole accepts as just.”).
184
This is reflected in the use of a balancing test in less than categorical takings.
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
185
BURKE, supra note 4, at 53 (“The science of government . . . [is] so practical in
itself and intended for such practical purposes . . . .”).
186
Id. Edmund Burke aptly notes this point:
What is the use of discussing a man’s abstract right to food or medicine? The question is upon the method of procuring and administering them. In that deliberation I shall always advise to call in the aid of
the farmer and the physician rather than the professor of metaphysics.
Id.
187
See, e.g., Steve Chambers, Public Use or Abuse?, STAR-LEDGER (Newark), Feb. 21,
2005, at 1 (“In New Jersey, 40 towns have [exercised their power of eminent domain]
since July 2003 alone, part of a nationwide phenomenon that has angered property
rights groups.”).
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to compensate for what nature has taken away (or back).
Visual
cues, not only as to nature, but also as to a landowner’s actions, help
to inform the decision to compensate. Is the landowner seen as “impos[ing] a restriction on the use of the oceans to promote his activi189
ties on his own land . . . ?” Or is the landowner simply trying to do
190
what everyone else is doing?
The answer is not simple, but in the scholarly pursuit of the
complicated analysis courts should not overlook the most practical of
starting points—observation. This quite literal “first glance” could
immediately lead to the answer. If an individual is attempting to
build where no one else thought to build, or where nature, due to
the owner’s lack of vigilance, has repossessed, there is a strong visual
cue of something awry—that perhaps what the landowner claims does
191
not “inhere in the title itself.” Compensation could then ironically
become the means of injustice. By putting forth this proposition, this
Comment in no way attempts to end the inquiry at visual cues, but
simply means to emphasize that often the answers to the most complicated questions are those that are easily overlooked, and that in
some property cases, justice should not be blind.
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Both State and the Federal governments often have social programs that compensate for natural disasters. For example, the National Flood Insurance Program
paid out over $3 billion dollars in disaster relief following Hurricane Hugo in 1989.
Houck, supra note 19, at 339. The very existence of these programs has been another rationale for not compensating economic wipeouts resulting from coastal regulations. Id. (referring to coastal development as “real estate on welfare”).
189
Sax, Public Rights, supra note 27, at 160.
190
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1008 (1992) (noting that Lucas’s
“intention with respect to the lots was to do what the owners of the immediately adjacent parcels had already done”).
191
Id. at 1029.

